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Electric, hybrid-electric, and turbo-electric distributed propulsion technologies and 
concepts are beginning to gain traction in the aircraft design community, as they can provide 
improvements in operating costs, noise, fuel consumption, and emissions compared to 
conventional internal combustion or Brayton-cycle powered vehicles. The National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is building multiple demonstrators and 
testbeds to buy down airworthiness and flight safety risks for these new technologies, including 
X-57 Maxwell, Hybrid-Electric Integrated Systems Testbed (HEIST), Airvolt, and NASA 
Electric Aircraft Testbed (NEAT). This paper addresses the safety system design process used 
at NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center, specific hazards associated with these new 
electric propulsion technologies, including an extensive investigation into the emergency-stop 
system for a HEIST, and other best practices. In general, the best course of action is to actively 
design out hazards associated with these systems, but when removing these hazards is either 
impossible or impractical, other safety protocols including keep-out zones, lock-out/tag-out, 
and other practices should be implemented. 
Nomenclature 
A    = amperage 
AC   = alternating current 
AC/DC  = alternating current to direct current (converter) 
AFRC   = Armstrong Flight Research Center 
AFSRB  = airworthiness and flight safety review board 
ARMD  = Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate 
BMS   = battery management system 
CANBus  = controller area network bus 
Cat   = category 
CIS   = cockpit interface system 
CRM   = continuous risk management 
CST   = combined systems test 
E-stop   = emergency stop 
EMI   = electromagnetic interference 
FMEA   = failure modes and effects analysis 
HAM   = hazard action matrix 
HEIST  = Hybrid-Electric Integrated Systems Testbed 
HIU   = hardware interface unit 
HR   = hazard report 
HSDR   = high speed data recorder 
LEAPTech = Leading Edge Asynchronous Propeller Technology 
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KOZ   = keep-out zone 
NASA   = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NEAT   = NASA Electric Aircraft Testbed 
O&SHA  = Operations and Support Hazard Analysis 
PHA   = preliminary hazard analysis 
PHL   = preliminary hazard list 
PPE   = personnel protective equipment 
RPM   = revolutions per minute 
RX   = receiver port / receiver 
SCRAMNet = shared common RAM network 
SHA   = system hazard analysis 
SIS   = simulation interface system 
SSHA   = subsystem hazard analysis 
SSP   = systems safety plan 
SSWG   = systems safety working group 
TX    = transmitter port / transmitter 
VAC   = volts, alternating current 
VDC   =  volts, direct current 
VFR   = visual flight rules  
I. Introduction 
HE National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) 
has identified reducing energy consumption, emissions, and noise for future aircraft in their Strategic 
Implementation Plan.1 In order to accomplish these goals, technology development, simulation, flight demonstration, 
and ground testing must be performed to mature new concepts and retire electric, hybrid-electric, and turbo-electric 
propulsion flight risks. NASA is currently developing and testing the X-57 Maxwell (Empirical Systems Aerospace, 
Inc., Pismo Beach, California) all-electric airplane, the NASA Electric Aircraft Testbed (NEAT) for testing megawatt 
scale components, the Hybrid-Electric Integrated Systems Testbed (HEIST) for testing flight components with 
simulation-feedback, the Airvolt test stand, a single highly-instrumented electric motor-propulsor, and others in 
development. These testbeds represent key capabilities for the X-57 Maxwell airplane and future electric, hybrid-
electric, and turbo-electric flying demonstrators. There are numerous electrified aircraft propulsion architectures being 
proposed, but all have inherent high voltage and current, requiring extensive safety considerations. This paper aims to 
identify safety hazards and mitigation strategies associated with these architectures. Figure 1 shows the X-57 Maxwell, 




Figure 1. NASA electric and hybrid-electric projects: X-57 Maxwell (left), HEIST testbed wing trailer (center), 
and Airvolt test stand (right). 
 
The X-57 Maxwell demonstrator is NASA’s first all-electric, manned X-plane. A Tecnam (Casoria, Italy) P2006T 
airframe has been mated with an experimental, high-speed cruise wing, and electric motors and batteries. The primary 
propulsors are two Joby Motors (Santa Cruz, California) JM-X57 motors paired to pitch controlled propellers 
producing 72 kW max (60 kW continuous) located at the wing tips of the new experimental wing. Twelve additional 
motors paired to fixed-pitch, folding props will be integrated as part of the final X-57 buildup. The fuel tank and 
plumbing have been replaced by a 57 kWh battery and a high voltage (461 VDC nominal) bus architecture, designed 
to be single fault tolerant.2 
T 
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The HEIST at NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center (AFRC) (Edwards, California) is configurable as an all-
electric, hybrid-electric, or turbo-electric test stand, and has aerodynamic loading feedback via a network of 
dynamometers and connectivity to the AFRC simulation labs. The testbed consists of eighteen Joby Motors JM-1 
electric motor / propeller propulsors, a Capstone (Chatsworth, California) C-65 Turbogenerator, an AC/DC converter 
(converting the 480 VAC from the turbogenerator to the DC bus), simulation computer, and all necessary signal and 
power routing. In order to obtain meaningful aircraft controls research for an electric, hybrid-electric, or turbo-electric 
configuration, the system must be tied into the simulation computers, allowing controls engineers to manipulate all 
the propulsors, battery system, and turbo-generator system. The need for direct connectivity of the testbed to the 
simulations laboratory as well as aircraft hangar regulations at NASA AFRC necessitated a testbed trailer setup, and  
allowed for testing flexibility while maintaining connectivity to the simulation laboratory.3 
Airvolt was the first AFRC all-electric demonstration project, designed to be a fully-instrumented, single propulsor 
test stand in order to better understand and analyze how current from the batteries ultimately produced thrust from the 
propeller, via the bus architecture, motor controllers, motor, and other equipment. Airvolt is currently being used as a 
method of acceptance testing for the X-57 Maxwell JM-X57 cruise motors. 
NASA is aggressively pursuing multiple all-electric, hybrid-electric, and turbo-electric models, test stands, and 
flying demonstrators, while endeavoring to maintain high levels of safety throughout the design process and testing. 
In order for these systems to retire electric, hybrid-electric, and turbo-electric distributed propulsion architecture risks, 
numerous safety considerations must be implemented, as these systems require high voltage and current, especially 
for the new megawatt-scale systems being proposed. A safety design is the incorporation of control methods and 
processes which begins early in the system design to either eliminate a hazard or mitigate risks to human health and 
safety throughout the lifespan of the platform.  
II. Electric, Hybrid-Electric, and Turbo-Electric Testbed Hazards and Mitigations 
To help assure mission success for these all-electric, hybrid-electric, and turbo-electric distributed propulsion 
projects, NASA is leveraging the hazard analysis process from the NASA Hazard Management Procedure4 to identify, 
eliminate, or control to an acceptable level the hazards associated with the projects that could affect human safety, 
damage or loss of assets, or loss of mission during the conduct of operations. NASA AFRC has a stringent hazard 
identification and mitigation system allowing the Center to self-certify experimental aircraft. This process starts with 
identifying hazards in preliminary hazard reports, complete with causes, effects, mitigations, and then categorizes the 
probability and severity for humans and assets. These preliminary hazards are then used to update the system and 
subsystem requirements. Once the hazards are accepted by the design board or reviewing committee, hazard reports 
are populated and signed off by the project manager or Center leadership, depending on the hazard severity and 
probability classification. 
The hazard analysis process must be implemented in the early stages of the project so that hazards can either be 
eliminated or minimized through the design process. This principle is especially critical when dealing with the 
complexities of new technologies and experimental systems, such as new electric motors, motor controllers, batteries, 
traction bus equipment, and other systems associated with these new electric / hybrid-electric architectures. Another 
critical element of the AFRC hazard management process is continuous risk management (CRM). CRM is not a one-
time pass through, but a continuous activity where the identification of new risks occur throughout the life cycle of 
the project.  
The hazard analysis process starts with the identification of Center responsibilities for mission success, 
airworthiness, ground / flight safety, and mishap contingency considerations. The hazard analysis process is usually 
accomplished by distilling requirements and objectives for the project, determining the required level of system safety 
support, and designating a system safety engineer to the project. The system safety engineer defines and tailors the 
project’s specific hazard management process through the development of the project’s system safety plan (SSP). 
Following the development of the SSP, the system safety engineer, in conjunction with the project manager and lead 
engineer, will establish the system safety working group (SSWG).  
The SSWG is comprised of personnel from across all project disciplines and skill sets and provides the forum 
where participants review potential hazards introduced directly or indirectly by the project. This forum creates an 
atmosphere where formal technical discussions and interactions between team members can take place that are crucial 
to fully recognize the causes of a hazard, the subsequent effects, and to develop strong mitigation actions.  
A mishap is the effect, or outcome, of the hazard. In the event of a mishap, a degree of severity will be assessed. 
It is that assessment that will drive the level of response to the particular mishap. Mishaps are categorized into 5 
categories ranging from catastrophic to close-call. A hazard cause is the condition that contributes to the hazard. It 
could be an unsafe design, environmental factors, hardware failure, software error, human error, et cetera. 
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Hazards are described in a scenario-based statement that addresses the cause (source) and effect (outcome); or 
source, mechanism, and outcome (i.e., consequence) to characterize the potential harm of the hazard. Hazard 
mitigations are the means by which a hazard can be eliminated completely or the probability and/or severity can be 
reduced (outcome). An order of precedence has been derived from experience that has shown that eliminating a hazard 
is the most effective means of preventing a mishap. 
The hazard mitigation order of precedence is as follows:  
1) Design to eliminate the hazard or to minimize risk (e.g., utilizing “fail-open” contactor relays, so that in the 
event of an uncontrollable failure, all high-power circuits will not be energized).  
2) Incorporate safety features and/or safety devices to minimize risk (e.g., incorporating an emergency-stop 
system or other inhibit device).  
3) Incorporate warning/caution/protective devices to minimize risk (e.g., flashing light with a sign to indicate 
that there is a radiation hazard present).  
4) Use special procedures/training/personal protective equipment to minimize risk (e.g., mission rules/operating 
limits, test procedures that contain warnings and precautions with regard to test being performed, high 
pressure systems training, hearing protection, safety glasses, gloves, hard hats, et cetera).  
5) Use of placards to minimize risk (e.g., implementing a propeller or audio-threshold keep-out zone with 
stanchions).  
In order to categorize a hazard, both the probability of occurrence and severity must be identified. Probability is 
the likelihood that an identified hazard will result in a mishap, based on an assessment of such factors as location, 
exposure in terms of cycles or hours of operation, and affected population. Severity is an assessment of the worst 
potential consequence, defined by degree of injury, loss of asset, property damage, the cost of an unforeseen event 
(loss of mission), or loss of data.  
The NASA AFRC hazard severity and probability categories in Table 1 are derived from the NASA safety 
manual,5 and are communicated by utilizing the NASA Armstrong hazard action matrices (HAM). The purpose of 
HAMs are to relate human safety hazards and loss of asset/mission in order to identify the associated overall hazard 
risk. These templates are used to convey the project’s residual risk (current category/projected final category) to the 
Center’s airworthiness and flight safety review board (AFSRB) and various project reviews during the course of the 
project. The purpose of the AFSRB is to ensure that projects are airworthy, safe, comply with Center policies and 
procedures, and maximize mission success. The AFSRB is comprised of the Center’s chief engineer, project 
management, subject matter experts, pilots, and operations and safety personnel. 
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Requires Center Director approval and may require approval by a higher authority. These hazards are defined as 
“Accepted Risks.” 
  Risk acceptance requires Center Director approval. These hazards are defined as “Accepted Risks.” 
  Risk acceptance requires Project Manager approval. 
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After the SSWG has been established, the hazard analysis process is initiated with the development of a 
preliminary hazard list (PHL); a series of brainstorming sessions where potential hazards are introduced to the team 
for consideration. All hazards deemed credible by the subject matter experts are documented using the AFRC hazard 
report (HR), and a preliminary hazard analyses (PHA) is performed.  
The HR is the primary tool used to document and track a hazard. A compilation of these forms for all identified 
hazards associated with a project serves as the primary documentation from the initial PHA through the subsequent 
analyses that follow, that is system hazard analysis (SHA), subsystem hazard analysis (SSHA), and operations and 
support hazard analysis (O&SHA) (if deemed applicable by the project). These analyses refine the PHA and identify 
additional hazards that may become apparent as the understanding of a project’s systems and operational requirements 
mature. 
The X-57, HEIST, and Airvolt projects have each undergone the AFRC hazard analysis process, and though the 
projects differ in overall system complexity, there are still many similarities in regards to design considerations that 
need to be made to assure overall reliability and safety of the systems. Some of these considerations are, but are not 
limited to: single fault tolerance, adequate margins (de-rate power systems, et cetera), ruggedization of critical 
components (thermal/mechanical), fail-safe mechanisms, circuit protection, interlocks, audio/visual alarms, 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) shielding, emergency manual shutdown, protective enclosures for power systems, 
et cetera. The full X-57 Maxwell traction bus hazard is shown as an example (Table 2) including hazard causes, effects, 
severity and probability for both human and asset categories, and mitigations. A full list of the HRs with the severity 
and probability for both human and asset categories for each project are shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3. NASA electric and hybrid-electric hazards, and severity/probability classifications. 
 





HR-1 Aircraft traction battery fire I D I D 
HR-2 Structural failure of wing  I D I D 
HR-3 Traction bus failure I E I E 
HR-5 Aircraft damage due to exposure to excessive environmental conditions during ground 
operations 
N/A III D 
HR-7 Wing control surface system failure I D I D 
HR-9 Inadequate stability control I D I D 
HR-11 Failure of motor mounts I E I E 
HR-12 Whirl flutter  I D I D 
HR-13 Symmetric loss of cruise propeller thrust (partial/total) II E II E 
HR-14 Avionics bus failure III E II E 
HR-15 Cruise propeller performance degradation and/or separation I E I E 
HR-17 Battery modules separate from attach points I E I E 
HR-18 Abrupt asymmetric thrust I D I D 
HR-19 Electromagnetic interference in flight N/A IV D 
HR-20 Landing gear structural failure  II D I D 
HR-21 Failure of propulsor system  I E I E 
HR-22 Restricted and/or obstructed crew egress I E N/A 
HR-23 Cockpit air contamination I E I E 
HR-24 Inadvertent cruise motor propeller rotation I E III E 
HR-25 Equipment pallet separates from attach points I E III E 
HR-26 Personnel exposed to high voltage/current I E N/A 
HR-27 High lift propeller damage and/or separation  Analysis in work 
HR-28 Classic flutter I E N/A 
HEIST 
HR-1 Propeller failure I E III C 
HR-2 Traction battery fire II E III D 
HR-3 Inadvertent system activation I E III E 
HR-4 Electrical discharge / shock / arc flash I E III E 
HR-5 HEIST ground asset collision I E II E 
HR-6 JM-1 motor failure I E IV B 
HR-7 Electrical fire II E III D 
HR-8 Damage to HEIST assets due to environmental factors N/A III E 
HR-9 Test article support structure failure I E III E 
HR-10 Excessive noise exposure II E N/A 
HR-12 Dynamometer system failure I E III C 
HR-15 Software operation outside of intended parameters N/A III C 
HR-16 Electromagnetic interference N/A IV D 
HR-17 Loss of hardware communication link N/A IV D 
Airvolt 
HR-1: Lithium polymer battery fire II E IV E 
HR-2: Airvolt test stand structural failure I E III E 
HR-3: Electrical fire III D II E 
HR-4: Electrical discharge/shock I E III E 
HR-5: Propeller / motor failure I E IV E 
HR-6: Test personnel exposed to excessive noise during system operation II E N/A 
 
A primary safety consideration for most aircraft and ground test projects is the use of a testing keep-out zone 
(KOZ). This keep out zone is in place during all testing activities and includes electric/hybrid-electric-specific 
considerations, such as: propeller keep-out zone, a motor magnet debonding hazard zone, and an auditory keep-out 
zone based on O&SHA regulations for excessive noise exposure. The propeller keep-out zone applies when a 
protective shield is not in use. The propeller keep-out zone is based on the FAR 25.905 dictating a 10% angle from 
the propeller plane.6 The keep-out zone distance is a function of the maximum propeller speed, propeller diameter, 
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and failure mode. While the implementation of a keep-out zone does not reduce the probability of a propeller failure, 
it does completely mitigate any substantial negative effects to all personnel. The HEIST team has also designed a 
protective shield, which mitigated both to a propeller failure and a debonded motor magnet. Experience from previous 
electric propulsion projects, including the Leading Edge Asynchronous Propulsion Technologies (LEAPTech) 
experiment,7 suggests that a debonded magnet from an experimental flight-rated electric motor is possible, and the 
exact effects of a lost magnet are yet unknown. Therefore, a protective shield has been implemented in order to reduce 
that risk until the full extent of that failure can be identified. Lastly, an auditory keep-out zone and personal protective 
equipment (PPE) required zone were also implemented, as the turbogenerator and propellers at full speed do exceed 
the O&SHA 85 dB threshold for long-term exposure. As shown in Fig. 2, the propeller, motor magnet, and audio-
threshold KOZ has a circular area for the audio decibel level threshold and motor magnet departure, with extensions 
in the propeller plane for blade departure. This KOZ is instituted during all testing and any troubleshooting where 




Figure 2. NASA Airvolt propeller, motor magnet, and audio-threshold keep-out zone. 
III. NASA HEIST Power Relay and Emergency-Stop Networks 
The HEIST testbed is a platform that supports a wide variety of components requiring multiple mitigations for 
each component and subsystem. One mitigation that was present in multiple HRs was the need for a robust emergency 
stop (E-stop) system. The definition of an E-stop is a functionality that is intended to prevent or reduce existing hazards 
to personnel or project assets. The E-stop system is a reactive system that does not prevent an incident from happening, 
but rather stops the process without creating additional hazards. 
This safety strategy began at the concept stage of the design process when initial decisions were made about the 
overall system layout, component selection, and functional testing requirements for the HEIST testbed and evolved 
through the life of the project. It is easier and lower cost to eliminate hazards or integrate safety mitigations at the 
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beginning of the project when everything is on paper rather than modifying the final product at later phases. This 
safety design included more than just the electrical circuit and physical layout; it required brainstorming potential 
hazards and design solutions as the testbed was manufactured, transported, set up, torn down, tested, and/or modified. 
One of the primary safety designs of E-stop is the network of contactor relays. This safety mitigation strategy 
directly or partially mitigates a propeller failure, traction battery fire, inadvertent system activation, electric discharge 
/ shock / arc flash, JM-1 motor failure, electric fire, damage to HEIST assets due to environmental factors, test article 
support structural failure, blowing debris from propeller wash, dynamometer system failure, software operation 
outside of intended parameters, electromagnetic interference, or loss of hardware communication link. This network 
removes all high voltage power from all power sources (6 battery banks and turbogenerator) and sinks (all motors and 




Figure 3. NASA HEIST relay network topology. 
 
The testbed also has software controlled contactors for research purposes shown as the simulation interface system 
(SIS). The two contactor relay networks are fundamentally separated in order to prevent a software failure 
inadvertently keeping the system from shutting down during an emergency. The high voltage bus operates at 100 VDC 
or 325 VDC (during different phases of the HEIST development). Activating the E-stop removes each battery (six 
100 VDC sets or two 325 VDC sets, depending on phase of development), the C-65 turbogenerator (via internal 
shutdown protocol), and the AC/DC converter off of the main power bus. The traction bus is separated into two buses, 
mimicking port and starboard wing traction power buses. The JM-1 motor / motor controller propulsors are organized 
into groups of 2 or 3 in order to limit the current flowing in any one contactor as well as provide added research 
flexibility to the system. An E-stop activation will also remove high voltage power to each motor / motor controller 
propulsor at the branch and each dynamometer, thereby cutting off all power to all power sinks. 
The NASA team decided that the E-stop system on HEIST would only remove the traction power (high voltage 
and high current) from the system and not the logic power to the motor controllers or the excitation power to the 
sensors. This decision was driven by the requirement that HEIST be able to work with a variety of components, and 
not all controllers maintain known states when logic power is removed during operation. In an emergency, human 
safety is the primary concern, but if the hardware can be salvaged, it can provide important data that may be helpful 
in determining the condition that led to the emergency, so that it may prevent it in the future. Additionally, the project 
chose not to remove power from sensors, as the data can provide real time information on the state of the system 
during a hazard condition.  
As a reactive system, the primary function of the E-stop circuit is the ability to safely load-break all power sources 
and loads operating at maximum power and quickly bring the 100 VDC or 325 VDC power system to an inactive 
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state. This process must be accomplished with a single human action, not in a series of steps, and it should not impair 
the effectiveness of other safety devices while being as simple as possible. The more components in the circuit, the 
more difficulty in troubleshooting, and more points of failure are present.  
The HEIST team endeavored to remove all possible single-point failures in the E-stop design, requiring 
redundancy of the E-stop power contactors, as historically these systems can react in unpredictable ways. The current 
HEIST configuration is a 200 kW system operating at 100 VDC. In subsequent phases, testing at higher voltages from 
325-400 VDC will be completed, and in later phases, there is the possibility of testing AC systems and doubly-fed 
induction motors which operate at higher frequencies. While these AC systems are not priorities at this moment, the 
HEIST team has considered them as it is more economical and easier to design in the functionality early than to modify 
it later. Since HEIST operates at the 100 VDC for the initial phases, the current at 100 VDC will be much higher than 
during all subsequent phases and operating ranges, therefore the system will get more current margin as the project 
matures. All component sizing and selections were based on this configuration; however, the physical system layout 
was designed to allow for quick substitution of various safety devices such as fuses. 
The E-stop circuit itself consists of two E-stop buttons in series controlling the excitation power to a contactor. 
The local E-stop button is a standard red mushroom button connected with copper cable. As HEIST is a mobile testbed 
potentially hundreds of feet from the control room where HEIST will be controlled, there were concerns of cable 
length limitations due to voltage drop on the E-stop circuit. To address this issue, the HEIST team incorporated a fiber 
optic E-stop design which provides greater flexibility in operating locations without compromising safety. The load 
side of the contactor passes the 24 VDC excitation power to all of the power contactors throughout HEIST from a 24 
VDC 100 A power supply that is dedicated to the E-stop circuit and the contactors. When either E-stop button is 
pressed, the contactor opens and removes all excitation power from the power contactors. While the total power 
consumption of all contactors and E-stop is less than 40 A, well within the capabilities of the power supply, it was 
decided that in order to mitigate risk, no non-safety related components would be connected to this circuit. This 
decision also provided additional benefit for future expansion and ease of troubleshooting. The contactors and E-stop 
buttons selected are normally open in their non-energized state. This distinction was chosen so that in the event of any 
failure, from broken wires to damaged coils, the system would not inadvertently activate. 
While effective, the E-stop system is not the only hazard mitigation employed. The HEIST testbed also includes 
manual disconnects to physically disconnect motors and motor controllers from the traction power bus before 
technicians work on the system. Inside each battery box, the AC/DC converter, turbogenerator, and fuse box include 
dead facing contactors which remotely isolate power from the all feed-throughs to avoid inadvertent contact between 
personnel and live circuits. Redundant contactors were chosen for the power system, in essence it would require five 
separate contactors to fail in series to allow a power source to connect to any motor. The battery boxes have their own 
safety considerations which include disconnect switches between sections, fusing, and cell segregation as well as cell 
voltage and temperature monitoring in the battery management system (BMS). 
In addition to addressing hazards present during expected use cases, designing for safety also entails preventing 
hazards caused by failure modes. Effects stemming from failure modes should be examined to identify conditions 
which are hazardous to personnel or equipment. Safe recovery states should be identifiable for each hazardous 
condition. The system should then be configured to default to these safe states in the event of a failure, and preferably 
be implemented through hardware means. It is entirely possible for there to not be any overall system configuration 
that addresses all possible hazardous failure modes and effects. In such an event, the configuration which addresses 
as many personnel hazards as possible should be selected, with the remaining hazardous effects addressed through 
separate mitigations. 
Several of HEIST testbed hazards are introduced as a side-effect of being a remotely-controlled system. The root 
source of those hazards stem from the potential failure of the additional command, control, and communication nodes 
required, as well as the connecting communication links. Since these hazards stem from anomalous conditions, failure 
mode analysis is invaluable. 
Some of the results and mitigations from failure mode and analysis (FMEA) of the HEIST testbed control system 
are of trivial ease, albeit significant impact. For example, see the diagram of the HEIST reflective memory network 
topology in Fig. 4. The local network of the HEIST testbed consists of two groups of two nodes in close proximity 
each, with the groups separated by a large distance. Failures in the HEIST communication network could result in a 
loss of high-rate telemetry, or a loss of control of relays, the turbo-electric power system, and the dynamometers. 
These failures could hinder the ability to detect and respond to conditions hazardous to system health. The most 
relevant failure mechanisms of small networks with a low bandwidth utilization are either failure of relaying network 
nodes, whether that be by being merely unresponsive or actually dropping off the network because of power loss or 
hardware failure, or failure of the transmission line itself. Analysis was conducted to identify if any components could 
become isolated due to a single failure of one or more additional nodes from the network, and thus result in loss of 
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control and/or telemetry for all other nodes. The redundant ring topology was the best choice for the HEIST 
communication network, reducing network drop-out due to isolated nodes, but the transmission cable remains a single-




Figure 4. Redundant-ring network topology. 
 
A FMEA should be conducted for both nominal and off-nominal operations, as well as system startup and 
shutdown. The behavior of some contactor relays, pre-charge circuitry, and other high-power hardware may be 
different for a hard shutdown versus a systematic, nominal shutdown. The failure modes analysis should also focus 
on how the system, including the high-power hardware, respond to a hard restart, ensuring that no additional hazards, 
specifically human hazards, are created for these off-nominal events. An example being the determination of the 
default states of the relays controlling the motor controller logic supply power. The design choice accounted for two 
types of failure cases: the first case where the hardware interface unit (HIU, the embedded system controlling relays) 
resets unexpectedly or fails completely during any operational state, and the second case where the E-stop is activated 
during any operational state. What happens after failure? What happens after normal operation is restored? Analysis 
of these cases can be reduced to just considering what the effects are of introducing or removing interruptions in logic 
power on the two power input interfaces (i.e. logic power in, traction power in) to the motor controller, during each 
operational state (uncharged, ready, and running loaded). Analysis of the particular motor controllers used by HEIST 
suggests that suddenly removing traction power when running at full load, in the absence of commands to throttle 
down, may result in equipment damage, because the controllers attempt to maintain the previous revolutions per 
minute (RPM). Having the logic power relays fail open will power down the controller along with the traction power 
contactors in the event of an HIU failure, albeit at the cost of losing command and telemetry of all motor controllers 
via the controller area network bus (CANBus). This failure is deemed an acceptable risk, since failure of the HIU 
automatically ends the test and motors spinning down to a stop by free-running is a safe condition as long as the 
propeller keep-out zone has been utilized. 
IV. Designing for Safety of Remotely-Commanded, High Power Electric Propulsion Testbeds  
This section will identify and provide operational considerations for high-voltage electric distributed propulsion 
testbeds. As shown in Table 3, there are numerous hazards associated with these systems. This section will provide 
some examples of sound practices in programming remotely commanded systems.  
The first principle one should follow when designing remotely-operated systems for safety is to check inputs, such 
as commands and initial configurations, for correctness and reject incorrect inputs. A high-speed data recorder (HSDR) 
was used to capture sensor data at much higher frequencies (greater than 4 kHz) than the deterministic simulator 
computer system runs on (200 Hz). High speed data are sampled at 200 Hz and fed back into the simulator computer 
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by the HIU. The HSDR and HIU both check command inputs to verify legal values; commands with illegal values or 
commands not applicable to the current operating mode are ignored. Another example of this principle in the HEIST 
testbed design occurred during the initial configuration of these systems. Before applying a configuration loaded from 
disk during initialization, the loaded configuration should be checked for proper formatting and valid values. This 
implementation is a means of preventing un-commanded system operation or operation outside of prescribed limits. 
Utilizing the design approach for desired end-state command as opposed to toggle command is another safety 
design consideration. An example is the contactor relay Boolean command. A toggle command would be interpreted 
by the relay to switch positions (go from closed to open or open to closed). This methodology can provide issues and 
potentially unsafe conditions if the command frequency and the switching frequency are staggered or out of phase. A 
toggle command may be interpreted a time-step after it was intended, with a command for the reverse toggle still 
waiting. In order to maintain situational awareness, a return sensor would be needed to identify the position of the 
relay. Instead, commanding from desired end-state eliminates any issue with system frequency mismatches. If the 
end-state is desired to be open, the system will open (whether it is already or not). This implementation is a means of 
preventing un-commanded system operation. 
Another good practice in designing remotely-controlled targets is to have both received and implemented 
commands returned to the master as feedback. Both the HIU and the HSDR repeat back the commands they receive 
for a given iteration, in conjunction with reporting back the commands they will actually be implementing. There are 
several reasons for this implementation: 
1)  It provides acknowledgement that commands were received and confirms the data integrity of the 
commands so errors in the received message will be immediately identifiable.  
2) It validates the command against any differences in command returns.  
Another safety design approach is to actively search for both hardware and software faults, and have a means of 
correcting at least the minor ones short of halting operations or performing a full system reset. Utilizing heartbeat 
counters to reflective memory allows for all nodes in the memory ring to monitor the status of each other node. 
It is vital that all software and hardware be initialized to a safe, known state. Both the HIU and the HSDR start 
their hardware and software in a known inactive safe state following initialization, and remain waiting in these passive 
states until actively ordered to do otherwise via a valid, correctly formatted command. These considerations ensure 
that HIU and HSDR are in a state which ensures health, without human intervention, even if faults have occurred. 
Furthermore, these systems have safe states which they can default to during normal operations in the case of faults, 
providing a method of fault recovery short of full system reset. These implementations increase system robustness 
and operational flexibility. This implementation is a means of preventing un-commanded system operation. 
V. Conclusion 
Personnel safety is the primary consideration in safety system design. Safety system design must be introduced at 
the beginning of the project and mature throughout the design, fabrication, testing, and operations. The National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Armstrong Flight Research Center utilizes a safety process illustrated in 
Section II that addresses the project hazards, their specific causes, effects, severity and probability for human and asset 
damage, and mitigations. The traction bus failure hazard was specifically identified as a common hazard amongst the 
various electric / hybrid-electric projects. This paper addressed several safety design considerations, including the 
E-stop system which is a mitigation for almost all hazards, not by eliminating the causes of the hazards, but by reducing 
the severity of the effects. If it is not possible or feasible to completely eliminate a hazard in the design process, it is 
important to understand how to reduce the frequency of exposure to the hazard by personnel and/or reduce the 
magnitude/severity of the hazard exposure. Safety design, procedural steps, safety equipment, and vigilance in 
operations play a significant part in hazard mitigation. Taking this proactive approach allows designers to manage 
hazards throughout the project life cycle by improving their ability to make risk-informed decisions. 
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